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A B S T R A C T
For decades, Plateau State in Nigeria’s Middle Belt has witnessed repeated ethnor-
eligious violence. Over this period, both state and federal governments have estab-
lished formal Commissions of Inquiry (COIs) in response to unrest, tasked with
investigating violence, identifying perpetrators, and – ultimately – strengthening
accountability. While commissions’ mandates and specific outcomes varied, there
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is general consensus that inquiries have been largely ineffective at securing justice or
establishing accountability for violence. This study seeks to understand the expecta-
tions placed on, and role of, COIs in Plateau State as pathways to formal accountabil-
ity in a context of recurring violence. We argue that COIs are embedded in the
complex, multilevel networks and politics of state and non-state institutions. Civil
society, in turn, has diverse expectations and demands, and articulates these in frag-
mented ways. As a result, COIs served primarily as another avenue for interest-based
negotiations.
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I N T R O D U C T I O N
Plateau State in Nigeria’s Middle Belt has witnessed decades of repeated
ethnoreligious violence. In response to waves of unrest, between  and
, successive state and federal governments established Commissions of
Inquiry (COIs) to investigate immediate triggers and structural causes, docu-
ment violence, hear testimony, and make recommendations for government
action. However, multiple COIs have had only limited success in delivering
accountability and preventing further violence (Gofwen ; Sayne ;
Oyieke ). While efficacy and impact could be measured in several ways,
if we accept the extent to which recommendations of a commission have
been implemented by government as a key metric of impact (see Oyieke
), it is notable that no COI resulted in legal convictions for named perpe-
trators; nor is there evidence of appointments or removal from public office
attributable to the work of COIs.
This study seeks to understand why formal accountability mechanisms have
failed in this context. While conflict in Plateau State has been well-documented
(HRW , ; Higazi ; Sayne ) and COIs in Nigeria more widely
have received some scholarly attention (Yusuf ; Oyieke ), research on
COIs in Plateau State is very limited, and the role of civil society action in rela-
tion to COIs in this context has hardly been addressed at all. Existing literature
on COIs largely emphasises one of two explanations for limited effectiveness.
First, that the formal, institutional structure and position of COIs within the
state architecture is a determining factor. Where commissions have weak man-
dates, limited independence, and restricted powers of enforcement, it is argued
that they will be less effective (Hayner ). A second explanation emphasises
the role of wider social relations in the work of commissions. Where COIs, as
formal state-initiated institutions, are not under sustained pressure from civil
society to deliver on mandates, this will limit their impact (Maclean ).
This study advances our understanding of formal accountability processes in
fragile and conflict-affected settings by drawing together research on formal
accountability institutions, the role of civil society, and conflict itself.
Drawing on a series of qualitative key informant interviews in Jos, Plateau
State, we explore why recent COIs, as formal accountability mechanisms, have
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not produced accountability. The study conceptualises accountability as the
interaction between formal institutions and civil society actors in order to attain
enforcement of, for instance, legal sanctions (Fox a, b, ; Goetz &
Jenkins ; Peruzzotti ). It draws on literature on fragility and conflict
that has demonstrated how networked governance and fragmented authority,
alongside a divided civil society, shape the functioning of formal accountability
institutions (Orjuela ; Hagmann & Péclard ; Leonard ).
Through this, we demonstrate how COIs are embedded in, and interact with,
other political institutions and civil society. This strongly influences processes
and outcomes. While various COIs recommended the prosecution of senior
figures, ‘hard’ accountability through legal justice or removal of officials from
office, was not enforced. This resulted from both the networked and fractured
nature of multilevel governance, coupled with divided civil society unable to
exert sufficient pressure. The politically embedded nature of institutions and
parallel divisions in civil society are both features of the wider political and
conflict context, and have in turn compounded a lack of trust in COI processes
and the state.
This has implications for the potential of COIs to deliver ‘hard’ accountability
in particular. In contexts with a long legacy of inter-group violence, divided civil
society and contested and fragmented authority, institutional mechanisms for
accountability such as commissions may not be effective. Where civil society
has disengaged from formal accountability processes, interventions seeking to
prevent violence may be more effective if they, instead, support locally led initia-
tives for peacebuilding and reconciliation.
The article is structured as follows. The first section reviews existing literature
on COIs and factors influencing their functioning in fragile settings. The follow-
ing section presents an overview of conflict and COIs in Plateau State. We then
outline the research design, before the first empirical section analyses the pol-
itics and networks that have affected COIs. The next empirical section discusses
how civil society has engaged with, and contested, COIs in various ways. We con-
clude by discussing how this has undermined the potential of COIs to deliver
accountability.
C O M M I S S I O N S O F I N Q U I R Y A N D A C C O U N T A B I L I T Y
COIs are official, normally independent, temporary bodies established to inves-
tigate and document episodes of violence and abuse and make recommenda-
tions for action (Hayner ; Probert ; Probert & Heyns ). COIs
have a long history in Africa (Jain ), where approximately  national com-
missions were established between –, with  in Nigeria alone, repre-
senting the largest number on the continent (Jain ; Probert & Heyns
). This demonstrates COIs’ relevance not only in Nigeria, but in wider
regional and global processes of formal accountability.
COIs are premised on the understanding that, inter alia, ‘a legacy of grave
and systematic [human rights] violations generates obligations that the state
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owes to the victims and to society’ (Méndez : ). Commissions vary in
their legal underpinnings: some can compel witnesses to appear, while others
rely on voluntary cooperation. Some hold public hearings, while others are
closed and their findings presented (if at all) only on publication of a report
(Hayner ). COIs usually do not have legal powers to prosecute, and their
relationship with prosecutorial and judicial bodies can be complex (Kim &
Sikkink ; Bakiner ). They also, typically, have a narrower remit to
investigate specific episodes of violence, rather than long-running abuse or
regimes (Hayner : –).
How does the work of COIs link to conceptualisations of transparency and
accountability? Within commissions, transparency revolves around the notion
of ‘truth’: testimonies from survivors, witnesses and perpetrators about what
happened, to inform victims, family and society at large. Commissions can there-
fore potentially serve important functions acknowledging and addressing histor-
ical injustice and violence (Balint et al. ). Their mandates can include
proposing prosecution or other punishment for perpetrators, and/or propos-
ing reparations or other measures for victims (Méndez : ). In this
way, proponents contend that COIs are a more ‘flexible, participatory and
open mechanism’ than ‘criminal investigation’ alone (Probert : ).
Institutional dilemmas of commissions
COIs are ‘transversal accountability’ institutions: formal, state-initiated institu-
tions that bring together state and societal actors (Fox a: ). This builds
on O’Donnell (, ), who refers to institutional oversight and checks
and balances within the state as ‘horizontal accountability’ (see also Peruzzotti
& Smulovitz , ; Ackerman ). However, the extent to which
commissions deliver on this varies.
Through their emphasis on finding out what happened, the work of commis-
sions can contribute ‘answerability’: the justification or explanation for actions
by those involved (Fox b: ). Given their investigative powers, commis-
sions can be expected to produce ‘meaningful’ answerability (Fox a,
b: ) by compiling information on violent events, perpetrators and
impacts. Answerability is considered the ‘soft’ dimension of accountability.
Many feel, however, that answerability falls short of real accountability if it
remains without consequences (Fox b: ). By contrast, ‘enforcement’
is the ‘hard’ dimension: it leads to sanctions such as court convictions and
removal from office, and/or compensation and remediation (Fox b:
). While some commissions are prohibited from naming perpetrators,
those in Plateau State have recommended named perpetrators for prosecution.
The ‘naming of names’, according to Greenawalt (: ), is a form of
‘minimal accountability’ as it creates a public record of suspects and leads to
informal social sanction, even without formal penalties by the state. However,
it remains a contested issue in many contexts and civic groups have argued
that it risks a ‘blanket amnesty’ in some cases (Greenawalt : ).
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Given their institutional and legal limitations, COIs need the buy-in of other
actors in the political system to implement recommendations, in particular for
‘hard’ accountability measures that require cooperation of public prosecutors
and courts, and a range of actors to remove power holders responsible from
office. Thus, COIs are part of a dynamic involving multiple political actors.
Some therefore caution against concluding that particular commissions
have been ‘successes’ or ‘failures’, given their embedded nature. As Probert
(: ) notes:
It is very important to distinguish between commissions of inquiry as a potential tool
(or mechanism) of accountability from the entity which ultimately has the respon-
sibility to drive a process of accountability, namely the state … Commissions can
be part of successful or unsuccessful processes of accountability … but often the
implementation of their recommendations lies outside their own powers.
These institutional explanations, however, have developed largely separate from
the literature on governance in fragile contexts. This is notable, insofar as COIs
are often established in such contexts, and so the dynamics of fragility should be
of central concern. These contexts are often characterised by a ‘legal account-
ability deficit’ (Peruzzotti & Smulovitz ): an absence of strong, neutral pol-
itical institutions that can take measures to deliver ‘hard’ accountability.
Informal behaviours and misuse of office by state actors can also interfere
with accountability processes (Ackerman ; Peruzzotti ; Fox ).
Whereas research on the institutional dimensions of COIs in a wide range of
settings has been concerned with ‘the asymmetric power of the state’ affecting
commissions’ independence (Probert & Heyns : ), literature on fragile
and conflict-affected contexts suggests that institutions in these settings are not
only ‘embedded’, but operate within a system of authority so fragmented, that
governance is truly ‘hybrid’. In these contexts, power is less asymmetric, than it
is negotiated and produced through multiple state and non-state forms of
authority (Menkhaus ; Hagmann & Péclard ; Titeca & De Herdt
; Bagayoko et al. ). Leonard () argues that all governance is multi-
level and networked, including to communities and external actors. Competing
forms of authority are likely to undermine formal justice institutions. Therefore,
the networked nature of institutions, and their vulnerability to interference, may
be factors shaping COIs’ performance specifically in more fragile settings, of
which Plateau State is an example.
Fragile contexts may also undermine the work of COIs through the threat of
violence itself. A vast literature, developed particularly around truth commis-
sions, discusses the trade-off between justice and accountability on the one
hand, and peace and reconciliation on the other (Greenawalt ; Rotberg
; Rotberg & Thompson ). Stakeholders may need to accept that
(a degree of) amnesty is granted to perpetrators in exchange for obtaining
information about past events; the prevention of future injustice; and/or
peace. If a COI faces a similar trade-off, then answerability obtained through
their work may not lead to ‘hard accountability’.
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These studies emphasise COIs’ variable performance through their official
mandate and relationship to other political institutions. However, while these
explanations highlight the complexity of governance, they tend to minimise
the role of civil society and the wider public in shaping how institutions function.
The next section elaborates on this.
Civil society and Commissions of Inquiry
The debate on accountability politics has emphasised the role of civil society
actors in producing ‘vertical’ accountability (whereby citizens and civil society
have control over the state, such as through elections), but also in exercising
pressure to bolster horizontal accountability. They can do this by empowering,
or demanding the creation of, accountability agents within the state (Fox a,
b), such as demanding that a COI is established, lending it legitimacy and
influencing its process.
External pressure by societal actors is often required to ‘trigger’ official
checks and balances (Fox a: ), and strategic, cross-actor collective
action is associated with pushing for accountability (Fox , ). Indeed,
several studies suggest COIs are most effective when they result in civil society
mobilisation around implementation of policy recommendations or pressure
to reform political processes (Crocker ; Bakiner ; Probert ). In
the context of truth commissions, for example, Zvobgo () demonstrates
that the strength of domestic civil society, combined with the actions of inter-
national human rights groups, influences the adoption of truth commissions.
The length of time commissions often require to investigate and publish their
report, however, can mean that by the time they have developed recommenda-
tions, civil society interest has waned (Probert ). This suggests that where
civil society action is limited or delayed, the impact of commissions may also be.
However, there is still limited understanding of how dynamics of fragility
influence the interaction between societal actors and COIs. In many fragile set-
tings, civil society itself may be weak, lacking coordination (Crocker : ),
or focused on localised self-help activities, rather than on exerting direct policy
influence. Conflict research has clearly demonstrated how civil society may be
highly diverse and fragmented along identity lines (Crocker ; Orjuela
; Belloni ). If civil society is indeed fragmented or networked to differ-
ent parts of the state that are in competition, then different sections within civil
society may work in favour of and against impunity (Fox a: ). It is increas-
ingly recognised that accountability is attained through a combination of strat-
egies, including the collaboration between civil society and pro-accountability
actors at different state levels (Fox , ; Joshi ). While alliances
with pro-accountability agents within the state can be helpful, these actors
may be too weak to pro-actively counter those who undermine accountability
processes (Fox : ). Alliances are unlikely to be straightforward in con-
texts where political institutions are weak and where both state authority and
civil society are fragmented.
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Finally, the dynamics of violence itself, and its often discriminatory and tar-
geted nature – for example, in targeting particular groups –means that experi-
ences of violence vary. This renders the establishment of a singular, factual and
undisputed narrative of events extremely challenging (Ross ; Kent ).
It is also possible that some constituencies within civil society see ensuring future
security and enhancing accountability for past violence as mutually incompat-
ible, and either accept or reject trade-offs towards this end (Méndez ).
This highlights a number of dilemmas facing COIs, and potential explana-
tions for their performance, that are relatively neglected to date in the literature
on formal accountability pathways. The next section explores these in the
context of Plateau State, Nigeria.
P L A T E A U S T A T E : V I O L E N C E A N D A C C O U N T A B I L I T Y
Nigeria’s Middle Belt has witnessed recurring unrest over several decades, often
at critical junctures, such as elections (Ostien ; Krause ; Angerbrandt
; Madueke a). According to records of violence between  and
, Plateau State witnessed the second-highest levels of political violence
and conflict-related fatalities in Nigeria (see Figure ; Raleigh et al. ).
Jos, the capital of Plateau State, is one of the worst-affected locations, where
more than  people were killed in cycles of violence between  and
 (HRW ).
The conflicts involve a number of predominantly Christian communities on
the one hand, and predominantly Muslim Hausa-Fulani on the other. The
former are considered by some to be ‘indigenous’; while the latter are cate-
gorised by some as ‘settler’ groups, who migrated to the region more recently.
Figure .
Violent events and reported fatalities, Plateau State, Nigeria, January –
December . Data source: Armed Conflict Location & Event Dataset
(ACLED).
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The Constitution of Nigeria grants relatively more rights to those who belong to
‘indigene’ groups, contributing to deep divisions (Ostien ; Krause ;
Sayne ). While referred to as ‘settlers’, many have lived in Plateau State
for many generations and in Jos, many have repeatedly claimed to be among
the original inhabitants (Krause : ). In response, Plateau State has,
over time, created new boundaries and smaller subnational units in an
attempt to diffuse conflict, with limited success (Angerbrandt ).
Alongside structural drivers, violence can also be attributed to more proxim-
ate factors. Police and security forces have often failed to adequately protect civi-
lians and, in some cases, have targeted civilians during their operations, leading
to deep distrust and perceptions of partisanship (Higazi : ; Sayne ;
Madueke b). Politicians and religious elites have also been accused of com-
plicity in violence, by politicising identity, interfering in elections and
commercial land deals, and some directly mobilising attacks (Sayne : ).
Commissions of Inquiry as an accountability mechanism in Plateau State
Among other measures, multiple COIs have been established and tasked with
delivering accountability in response to recurring violence in Plateau State
(Krause ; Oyieke ). Table I presents an overview of COIs established
there since  by either state or federal government.
The last COI was operational in  (although COIs have continued to be
established elsewhere in Nigeria, see Oyieke ). After this date, the govern-
ment resorted to the use of committees only in Plateau State, which differ from
COIs in the process of investigation. Throughout this paper, different COIs will
be distinguished by referring to their chairperson. Each COI was tasked with
investigating a specific episode of violence, identifying and naming perpetra-
tors, and issuing recommendations. The authority responsible for establishing
COIs has varied: governments at both the federal and state level have argued
that they have a statutory responsibility to investigate violence (discussed
further below).
R E S E A R C H D E S I G N
The study draws on  key informant interviews with civil society actors and gov-
ernment officials who directly engaged with COIs (see Appendix ). Interviews
were held between January  and November . Participants were iden-
tified using snowball sampling, drawing on the network of the University of Jos.
The authors endeavoured to include a range of perspectives from all groups:
 out of  respondents were Muslim; and five respondents represented
youth organisations. All participants were directly involved in one or more
COIs either as a member, government official, or civil society actor.
The study focuses on COIs rather than advisory panels and committees,
although sometimes participants compared these. Since the Ajibola
Commission was the most recent (operational in , report released in
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) many participants focused on this commission specifically in their
responses as they recalled it most clearly. As such, the study is relatively more
focused on this, but also considers participants’ experiences with previous
commissions.
T A B L E I .
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Nevertheless, in terms of limitations, it is important to note that respondents’
accounts of historical COIs were susceptible to potential recall issues. To miti-
gate this, the authors conducted a review of media reports to verify details
recounted in interviews. Moreover, while we do not suggest the sample of
COIs discussed is either exhaustive, nor entirely representative, we suggest
that through our analysis of these, we arrive at insights that can further under-
standing of the role of formal accountability institutions in Nigeria and beyond.
Lastly, with regards to the scope of the study, while we include some limited dis-
cussion of the underlying conflict(s) that prompted the establishment of COIs
in the first instance, a full discussion of these complex dynamics remains beyond
the scope of this paper alone, where we focus instead on the COIs specifically.
T H E E M B E D D E D N E S S O F C O I S I N T H E P O L I T I C S A N D N E T W O R K S O F
T H E S T A T E
The few existing studies on COIs in Plateau State emphasise that they are, in
general, top-down instruments (Albert ) whose limited effectiveness can
be explained by government’s failure to follow up on recommendations
(Gofwen ; Sayne ; Oyieke ). This section discusses the nature
of networked governance in Plateau State, and how COIs are embedded in pol-
itics at federal and state government level and, by extension, in conflict dynam-
ics themselves. This helps to explain why COIs have had limited success in
producing ‘soft’ accountability, and have ultimately failed to produce ‘hard’
accountability. Consequently, we find that their lack of responsiveness has
strengthened a sense of impunity and further deepened mistrust.
Competing interests within the state
Government inaction over implementing recommendations has been acknowl-
edged by successive commissions. The Ajibola Commission report explicitly
states that recommendations made by the Niki Tobi Commission and
Fiberesima Commission were not implemented, and that this was ‘one of the
major remote causes’ of the re-eruption of violence (Ajibola Commission of
Inquiry : –). Both commissions recommended the prosecution of
named individuals, and monitoring of certain organisations believed to have
played a role in instigating violence (Ajibola Commission of Inquiry :
–). Some respondents emphasised that the fact that COIs did not result in
meaningful ‘hard’ accountability cannot be understood as a failure of the
Commissions themselves, and instead highlighted wider government inaction.
As one interviewee noted:
We cannot say outrightly that it is the fault of the commission itself, because they are
the only ones, they are given assignment to do, but we expect that the government at
the end of the day will implement the decisions of those commissions of inquiry.
(Int. , )
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In emphasising the role of government in the implementation of recommenda-
tions, respondents placed responsibility for accountability with wider institu-
tions of public authority. While the state government did take some violence
prevention measures in response to COI recommendations, nobody was
prosecuted.
The question whether security concerns hampered the implementation of
COI recommendations to prosecute provoked varied responses from civil
society. Some respondents were critical about the government setting up
COIs and identifying perpetrators if it was not prepared to prosecute. In inter-
views, all respondents noted that none of the named individuals were ever taken
to court and convicted. As one interviewee exclaimed, ‘They are today walking
the streets of Jos as free men!’ (Int. , ). A review of media articles
confirmed that none of the individuals recommended for prosecution by the
Ajibola Commission were indeed prosecuted. On the contrary, numerous
figures who were accused of instigating violence continue to hold public
office or prominent political roles (see Daushep ). Many respondents
felt the risk of future violence by named perpetrators had been presented as
an argument by successive governments, but one that primarily served to
protect prominent figures from prosecution (Ints , , , , ).
Respondents highlighted what they felt was the effective impunity of govern-
ment officials and politicians implicated in violence. This was considered a
major reason for the delay in public release of reports, as well as lack of
implementation.
By contrast, some respondents found the government’s claim that it was
better not to implement recommendations as it would provoke further violence,
credible (Int. , ). Some named perpetrators were considered influential
in their communities and, if arrested, they could instigate unrest. Other respon-
dents pointed to specific recommendations that would have had security impli-
cations. The Ajibola Commission recommended redrawing territorial
boundaries of Jos North LGA (Right to Know : –), which would likely
provoke tensions and possibly new conflict, according to one respondent (Int.
, ). Even those civil society representatives who were vocal about the
lack of government responsiveness, acknowledged the risks of arresting high-
level officials. For example, one respondent stated that, if the recommendations
for prosecution included in the Ajibola Report were implemented, this would
very likely have triggered large-scale violence (Int. , ). One Muslim
respondent remarked that prosecuting many of the high-profile Muslim
leaders indicted in the report would not address ‘any evil or vice, it will create
more. It will make the state ungovernable’ (Int. , ). When asked about
the lack of prosecutions, a former Secretary to the State Government main-
tained that the challenges of compiling evidence had inhibited arrests of
senior officials. He did not refer to public security as a reason and refuted the
claim that the State Government was sustaining impunity (Int. , ).
Some respondents spoke of how such actors ‘hold the state hostage’ by threa-
tening to trigger violence (Ints , , ). One highlighted that those in
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charge of handling reports are afraid of more senior officials: ‘If they release the
reports, it might hurt one or two persons and it will affect their [own] political
career’ (Int. , ). Another respondent stressed that recommendations to
indict senior officials, party leaders and politicians can become ‘political liabil-
ities’, and that pressing for those recommendations that are unpopular among a
certain constituency is a risk as one might lose elections (Int. , ). The fol-
lowing respondent explained how impunity is the effect of informal, multi-
layered networks:
Every untouchable political actor is covered by a godfather. Secret cults in the
polity … and there are many of them, quite frankly. [They are] Well linked-up,
well-connected nationally, internationally. Some of their names are there in the
Commissions of Inquiry [reports]. I don’t know how these people would be prose-
cuted. The moment you start, as a matter of fact you would … you will hit the rocks.
That is why the security agencies like the police would be reluctant to go arrest some
of these characters. … It means people are above the law. (Int. , )
These accounts thus suggest that competing and networked interests within the
state shaped the functioning and impact of COIs. The following section elabo-
rates on how fragmentation and networks between the state and federal govern-
ments may further explain accountability outcomes.
Multilevel networked governance and fragmented authority
Across a range of stakeholders, consultations illustrate the dynamics of multi-
level, networked governance and how the negotiation of justice by different
actors sustains impunity. It is worth noting that the tensions surrounding
levels of state and federal authority, detailed below, are not unique to the
issue of COIs in Plateau State. They reflect broader issues related to federal gov-
ernance and inter-group conflict in Nigeria (Suberu , ; Angerbrandt
), and have affected the composition and establishment of COIs beyond
Plateau State as well (Oyieke ).
One central theme among respondents was the role – and control – of security
forces during and following crises. In one interview, a former State Governor of
PlateauStatereportedhewasconvinced that thefederalgovernmentwas frustrating
legal justice at state level.He argued that it was not the fear of renewed violence that
stopped his government from implementingCOI recommendations, but obstacles
createdby thefederal government-controlledpolice forceandarmy(Int.,).
By his account, security forces were instructed not to arrest any person indicted by
COIs; and also not to implement more practical laws enacted to respond to COI
recommendations, such as preventing the use of motorcycles in the city.
A respondent from a human rights organisation recalled that the federal gov-
ernment appointed former Commissioner of Police, Alhaji M.D. Abubakar, as
the acting Inspector General of Police in  (Obateru & Binniyat ).
Among other individuals, the Niki Tobi Commission had named Abubakar in
its report as a perpetrator in the  crisis. The government had named
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him in its White Paper and recommended his retirement (Obateru ). Two
civil society actors interviewed stated they had alerted the state government to
the appointment, who had publicly disapproved (Int. , ). Despite this,
the appointment was not revoked: a failure for ‘hard’ accountability.
A second theme related to prosecution specifically, and judicial procedures
more generally. With regards to lower-level perpetrators, one respondent
observed that the state government did not follow due process and this ham-
pered justice procedures (Int. , ). He recalled that during the 
crisis, many more suspects were arrested and imprisoned than ever before,
but there was no capacity to properly investigate each case. Someone could
be charged for the illegal possession of firearms if caught with one, but in
most cases, there was insufficient evidence and investigative capacity to pros-
ecute ‘rank and file’ suspects for more serious crimes, this respondent
claimed. In his capacity as a lawyer, he had directly engaged with the
Attorney General in , requesting better documentation of evidence. In
his view, the federal government intervened because the state government
could not handle the cases properly. However, a lawyer and representative of
Muslim communities argued the federal government intervened in 
because it had become aware of the many arbitrary arrests of Muslims and
suspected the state government was unable to guarantee them fair justice
procedures (Int. , ).
Underlying the above disputes, were competing claims over jurisdiction. In
Nigeria, the federal government is empowered to establish a commission only
where its remit concerns the actions of the federal government (or a branch
of it, such as the army or police) and/or it occurs in Abuja Federal Capital
Territory (Oyieke ). All other commissions should be instituted at state
level. However, the extent to which cycles of violence in Jos fell under federal
jurisdiction was interpreted variously by respondents.
By way of illustration, one respondent maintained that if perpetrators were
caught but were ‘foreign’ to the state, the state government had to refer the
case to the federal government, after which it was unclear whether they went
to trial. This signalled a lack of transparency and undermined confidence in
the accountability process (Int. , ). Several other respondents, including
representatives of the state government, spoke of perpetrators being ‘taken to
Abuja’, synonymous with federal government interference (Ints , , ,
). A former senior official from the Ministry of Justice confirmed that
cases of suspects who were caught with arms were taken over by the federal gov-
ernment (Int. , ). He declared that at the time, the state government had
written to the federal Attorney General to ask for suspects to be handed back to
Plateau State authorities for local prosecution. This was granted, but many sus-
pects were not handed over. As a result, this respondent spoke with deep suspi-
cion of the federal government, commenting:
Legal justice procedures in this country are flawed … the federal government can
actually frustrate whatever judicial process you are taking as a state … To a large
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extent they [State Government] can’t do anything because it’s at the goodwill of
whoever is in charge of security at the federal level. (Int. , )
Another government respondent echoed these sentiments, describing
‘frustrated’ efforts on the part of state-level authorities to prosecute suspects
(Int. , ). Together, these remarks highlight not only the challenges frag-
mented, multi-level governance can pose for accountability processes generally,
but also that they can prove obstructive even for those who see themselves as
pro-accountability actors and champions within the state architecture. In
other words, even some within the state, who saw themselves as actively
working to deliver accountability, shared some of the frustrations of civil
society actors mobilising from outside the system.
While the absence of legal justice could to some extent be caused by a lack of
clarity over jurisdiction and responsibilities on the part of state and federal gov-
ernments, and the inability of both to resolve this, the consultations reveal
deeply rooted suspicions among some about existing networks between senior
officials and suspected perpetrators or sponsors of violence. Rumours about
informal networks within federal and state governments, and elites working to
protect certain groups, persist to this day, and are an indication of how multi-
level, networked governance functions in Plateau State.
Overall, consultations highlighted that the state had failed to take COI recom-
mendations forward and some perceived this as deliberate obstruction of justice
and an impediment to peace. Respondents across communities indicated that
the perceived lack of action in implementing recommendations of successive
COIs has had detrimental effects on legitimacy and public trust. It has led to
strong feelings about the state protecting individuals responsible for instigating
violence, thus sustaining impunity.
C I V I L S O C I E T Y , C O M M I S S I O N S A N D A C C O U N T A B I L I T Y
Civil society in Plateau State is active and diverse. Many organisations and associa-
tions work as interest groups for specific ethnic and religious communities,
whereas several peacebuildinggroups exist that cut across ethnic and religious lines.
The most important way in which civil society actors formally engaged with
the COI process was by submitting memoranda and sending representatives
to give oral testimonies during hearings. In order to compile and present
these contributions, CSOs conducted their own investigations into crises by vis-
iting and speaking with affected communities. Secondly, CSOs worked to raise
awareness of COI processes and help communities write their own submissions,
thus enabling them to take part in the process. One respondent recalled that his
organisation actively encouraged people to engage with COIs, saying that CSOs
‘should help in calming nerves and urging the people, for instance, that the best
way to ventilate their grievance is before the tribunal’ (Int. , ).
Beyond investigations and hearings themselves, CSOs also engaged with
resulting reports, such as by issuing press releases calling on the government
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to release reports and discuss recommendations (Right to Know : ).
Certain organisations, like Right to Know, mobilised to ‘unearth’ reports that
had been kept out of the public domain for years, and actively campaigned
for the implementation of recommendations. Some interviewees reported
that they raised concerns about the government’s failure to implement recom-
mendations (Int. , ).
This section analyses how, in the context of inter-group violence and interest-
based civil society mobilisation, those in favour of ‘hard’ accountability com-
peted with those in favour of more reconciliatory approaches. In effect,
broad-based, collective action did not emerge in this context, which ultimately
determined the extent to which civil society was able to pressure other actors in
the accountability chain to implement recommendations.
Civil society expectations of COIs and perceptions of accountability
For several years, civil society actors maintained hope that COIs would be an
effective measure to contribute to peace and justice, and so the establishment
of COIs became a key demand of civil society actors.
The diverse motivations for this demand are a first indication of the varied
interests of civil society actors. At the international level, civil society actors
emphasised ‘hard accountability’. In their official submission to the COI and
Presidential Panel of Investigation set up to investigate the  violence,
Human Rights Watch contended: ‘These investigative bodies should ensure
that their findings are made public and call on government authorities to pros-
ecute without delay those responsible for the killings and destruction of prop-
erty, irrespective of which side of the conflict they are on’ (HRW : –).
By contrast, interviews reveal how local and national civil society perceived
tensions and trade-offs between peace and ‘hard accountability’. In terms of
the manner in which commissions operated, one respondent argued that
some COIs had operated in a manner that was ‘too legalistic’: the language
used in sessions was inaccessible, jargonistic, and in some cases lawyers accom-
panied those who gave their testimonies because they were afraid to use the
wrong language (Int. , ). Reflecting an alternative view, two respondents
felt that a weakness of commissions was that they had no power to summon crit-
ical witnesses, which would result in a lack of balanced evidence (Ints , ,
). Similarly, another respondent felt that COIs could not operate sufficiently
like a court of law and pass judgement and enforce punishment. Lastly, one
respondent, remarking on the difference between early COIs and later commit-
tees, remarked that committees operated more like ‘investigators’, drawing an
analogy to a police inquest, whereas COIs had created a space for listening
that was better appreciated (Int. , ).
These diverging views reflect the fact that the expectations of civil society were
themselves highly diverse. Some groups wanted COIs to produce ‘soft’ account-
ability by privileging truth-telling over investigative approaches; while others
wanted COIs to operate in a more legalistic form and produce ‘hard’
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accountability leading to convictions. Respondents diverged strongly in their
perspectives on the trade-off between accountability through legal justice and
reconciliation:
Most of these Commissions of Inquiries do not promote genuine reconciliation, they
end up tagging people: either these are the victims or these are the perpetrators. So
it doesn’t in any sense promote reconciliation, the end result should have been a
reconciliation and healing of wounds so we can have a genuine reconciliation
and also have sustainable peace but they don’t do that. (Int. , )
Community groups organised around ethnic and religious lines had additional
expectations and demands. A leader of one ethnic association remembered they
had ‘definitely requested that there was a need for even a Judicial Commission
of Inquiry, not just a panel’ following the  crisis (Int. , ). Their
expectation was that a COI would investigate the root causes of conflict,
whereas a panel would be limited to investigating immediate triggers, events
and perpetrators. Representatives from a Yoruba association stated they had
appealed to the state government to establish a COI to ensure it was officially
recorded that Yoruba communities were also affected by violence, not just the
three main ‘indigene groups’ (Int. , ). They also hoped that this
would lead to compensation for the loss of assets. Hausa-Fulani representatives
expressed the hope that COIs would offer another opportunity to attain
‘indigene’ rights and status (Int. , ).
In this way, the hearings were seen by some as a new battleground, with groups
trading accusations and thus potentially renewing tensions. A civil society repre-
sentative who had been actively involved in the Niki Tobi COI recalls how
members of contending groups had attended the hearings with their ‘teams of
lawyers … Both the Christians and the Muslims were all prepared to go and do
a lot of legal fireworks’ (Int. , ). One interviewee from an inter-faith
CSO noted that this affected the work of the COI as it distracted from the
deep causes of the conflict, as well as from truth-telling and reconciliation (Int.
, ). While civil society groups that worked across ethnic divides emphasised
the possibility that truth-telling could help build peace, another respondent ques-
tioned the role of COIs altogether: ‘Hostilities will cease but the Commission of
Inquiry itself becomes a stage for exchange of salvoes [gun fire]’ (Int. , ).
Ultimately, COIs, rather than becoming a space for reconciliation, became
another space for contestation between different groups; a clear indication of
how COIs are embedded in local contexts and in this case, became part of
conflict dynamics. The divisions in society, reflected in divergent expectations
and demands of COIs, shaped civil society’s engagement with commissions,
their resulting reports and their demands on the government.
Fragmentation and civil society action
Compounding these divergent expectations, divisions in civil society inhibited
civil society from mobilising collectively and exerting the necessary pressure
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on government actors to prompt forms of horizontal accountability. This did
not mean there was no collaboration at all: some groups bargained with other
groups on specific interests, as this section demonstrates, but concerted, collect-
ive action for accountability remained elusive, and this is considered key to suc-
cessful accountability processes (Fox , ).
From the outset, CSOs were often divided about the composition of COIs.
Contending groups disagreed over whether and how different groups should
be represented, affecting perceived neutrality (Ints , , ). Several
CSOs reported they had actively ‘screened’ nominated COI members, espe-
cially the chairperson, and would publicly announce disagreement if they
found that ‘anyone has been compromised or is not qualified’ (Int. , ).
Respondents recalled disagreement over the appointment of Major General
Abisoye as chairperson of the panel set up in , because he had presided
over the military tribunal that tried and executed prominent members of
groups referred to as ‘indigene’ from Plateau State for their involvement in
the  coup (Akinwale : ). Fueling debates in the public domain
was an important strategy to influence public perceptions of a COI, which
could then influence how civil society and the public at large engaged with its
work.
The ways in which different parts of government are perceived and accused of
‘bias’ is another example of how groups interpreted actors and networks in rela-
tion to their interests, and reflects the role of the state itself as an actor in the
conflict. In the case of Ajibola Commission, suspicions of bias led Hausa-
Fulani groups to oppose its establishment. One respondent, reflecting deep-
seated fears at the time, shared that some members felt ‘that the State
Government was behind that crisis and it planned the crisis with the view to
see that most of the Hausas were terrorised, killed or chase out of their
house’ (Int. , ). Others noted that the government’s role in the violence
informed calls for community members not to take part in the inquiry (Ints ,
, ). Another respondent reported having personally issued a media state-
ment calling on Hausa-Fulani in Jos to boycott the COI. He recalled how the
State Governor announced on the first day of the  crisis that ‘the riot
was started by Muslim youths in Ali Kazaure’. The respondent felt that in
doing so, this Governor, as a political leader for all, had taken sides. The
same respondent reasoned that:
The nature of the conflict also determined how a Commission of Inquiry is received,
if it is a conflict between a community or a group or with the government or any of
the government agencies, you see, it looks naturally that “okay, you (the state gov-
ernment) are the judge in your own … case”. (Int. , )
He stated that he and his community therefore engaged with the Abisoye Panel,
as they did not trust the state government and, by extension, the Ajibola COI, to
be fair and just. He concluded: ‘How they [COIs] come about and the political
atmosphere, you know … the environment at the time of their setup is what
determines the shape they take and also the response they get’ (Int. , ).
C O M M I S S I O N S O F I N Q U I R Y A N D A C C O U N T A B I L I T Y , N I G E R I A
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X21000252
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 109.151.204.193, on 03 Dec 2021 at 09:56:56, subject to the Cambridge Core
Allegations made by civil society actors about networks between elites at federal
and state level that would protect the interests of certain groups echo the rumours
discussed above regarding impunity. Some respondents maintained that the state
and federal governments are biased and on the side of particular groups. In broad
terms, state government was accused of siding with the main ‘indigene’ groups
and the federal government of siding with ‘settler’ groups, which would
influence how each group engaged with COIs (Int. , ; Int. , ).
Once established, some respondents noted that diverse interests among civil
society groups limited opportunities for coordination and effective collabor-
ation once inquiries were underway:
No, I don’t think we have liaised [with other groups]. We have been more or less
focussed [on our group’s point of view] because we have a non-interest. Other
actors have their own interest. Sometimes is even very difficult … even the indigen-
ous groups themselves don’t even sit at one common platform so it will be difficult to
do. (Int. , )
However, civil society collaboration was not absent altogether. Rather, bargain-
ing and collaboration among ethnic associations takes place, but is very much
interest-based and depends on the sensitivity of an issue. Peacebuilding and
human rights organisations that were not ethnically aligned were more likely
to collaborate to pressure government on COI recommendations. A represen-
tative from the Berom community explained it as such:
We try to just liaise with certain groups to be able to see our own interests, or to see
our common stands on certain issues, but I don’t think we have really relied on them
[for collaboration], but we have to make our positions very clear and then push for
them. (Int. , )
Other examples include cooperation between a Hausa-Fulani association who
collaborated with Igbo associations over the recommendation to reconstruct
markets and commercial centres, and demands for compensation, despite
their different positions on other matters. Representatives from Christian net-
works also said they had collaborated with Muslim religious leaders over the pro-
tection of places of worship. However, issues related to ‘indigene’ and ‘settler’
rights and citizenship were deeply divisive and ‘frontiers nobody wants to cross’,
according to a journalist (Int. , ). The issue of prosecution was also
heavily contested, with each group wanting to protect their own, especially
when named suspects were important leaders. The representative of a
women’s organisation, which has worked across ethnic divisions, said:
Sometimes we have politicians themselves trying to get their tentacles into civil
society to cause that dissipation of energy, or to make sure there is no unity of
purpose. Civil society itself is fragmented by politicised interest, so who is civil
society? Civil society itself is fractured. (Int. , )
Apart from civil society being fragmented, delays in publishing reports also
meant that momentum to act on COI recommendations waned.
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Organisations prioritised other, ongoing activities, sensing that peacebuilding
activities and dialogues were more likely to contribute to peace than pushing
the government on COI recommendations. CSOs working for the interests of
those referred to as ‘settler’ communities carried on advocating for more polit-
ical inclusion. This, too, has potential long-term implications for state legitimacy
and cohesive authority in fragile contexts: one respondent specifically noted
that through their work for justice, CSOs were taking on the work rightfully
led by the state (Int. , ).
Regardless of the group to which one belonged, many interviewees reflected
that the lack of responsiveness and hard accountability has had a longer-term
impact on the perceived legitimacy of state institutions:
[The governments] just use them [COIs] so to placate people to be seen that
government is interested in addressing crisis or resolving crisis and then after the
commissions have done their work or whatever, writing beautiful reports then
the reports are just there more or less gathering dust. (Int. , )
Another respondent summarised: ‘it became very monotonous; crisis will occur,
we (the government) will set commission of inquiry to investigate, and at the
end of the day reports are not implemented, so that has made the public lose
confidence in their work’, and suggested that the public would not be interested
in any new COI (Int. , ). This exasperation was reflected in multiple
respondents’ accounts, with one remarking that COIs became, over time, ‘just
the routine that we do: when there is trouble, we set up the commission as a
routine and then when the tempers cool down, government does not even
care about the report anymore until another incident happens’ (Int. ,
). Another respondent echoed these sentiments, contending that the
state’s actions deepened the problem, ‘for the simple fact that they failed to
implement the first one, they allowed the problem to degenerate to such a
level that it is increasingly becoming almost impossible to implement those
recommendations again’ (Int. , ).
C O N C L U S I O N
This study has highlighted key factors associated with fragility in Nigeria’s
Middle Belt, and how they have shaped pathways to accountability in Plateau
State. Existing research demonstrates that crises of credibility and issues of par-
tiality undermine the ability of formal accountability mechanisms to deliver
hard or soft accountability (Oyieke ). We propose that our understanding
of these effects can be advanced through further consideration of the socio-pol-
itical context in which COIs operate, specifically their position within the polit-
ical architecture and in relation to civil society. Further, when established in
fragile contexts, specific features of that context affect their functioning, includ-
ing the contested and fragmented nature of authority, and divided civil society.
The findings show that COI processes themselves have helped bring about
some limited degree of transparency and answerability, or ‘soft’ accountability
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(Fox a, b). Due to the investigative powers of COIs and their mandate
to name perpetrators, they arguably contributed to answerability as the role of
individuals and institutions was recorded in detail in reports. Violent events and
their impact on communities were documented, and the voices of those affected
were formally acknowledged. According to some, the process of providing testi-
monies helped to ‘cool down’ the volatile situation temporarily (Int. , ).
However, the findings also show that COIs were embedded in wider power
dynamics and societal divisions, which were then reproduced in the work of
commissions themselves. In this context of recurring violence, the mandate to
‘name names’ and recommend individuals for prosecution meant COIs
became contested fora for competing interests within the state, between mul-
tiple levels of the state, and within and between deeply divided civil society
actors. As a result, COI reports and the ‘truths’ they contained were not
widely accepted.
With respect to ‘hard’ accountability, COIs have not been effective, neither in
and of themselves as they cannot prosecute, nor by prompting government
actors to do so. The fragmented nature of public authority, and the belief
that this fragmentation mapped onto networks between political elites and
leaders of different ethnic groups, were primary causes of this lack of enforce-
ment. This eventually contributed to a lack of trust in both COI processes
and the state.
However, explanations for the outcome of accountability processes that focus
on state institutions alone neglect the important role civil society plays in
shaping accountability pathways. Fragmentation within civil society – reflected
in the diversity of demands and expectations on COIs, and in contestations
between civil society groups in the course of inquiries – compounded the chal-
lenge COIs faced delivering ‘hard’ accountability. Whereas the literature recog-
nises that civil society has an important role to play in maintaining pressure on
governments to implement recommendations and enforce sanctions (Crocker
), momentum to act on COI reports waned. Before , it seemed that
many civil society actors believed that COIs could potentially contribute to
justice and peace, but this hopefulness diminished due to the lack of govern-
ment responsiveness. Many CSOs resumed their focus on peacebuilding and
rights issues, disillusioned with the lack of political will to take COI recommen-
dations further. At the same, civil society itself was so divided that it was unable
to take concerted action either to pressure different state institutions and
bolster horizontal accountability, or demand vertical accountability
(Peruzzotti & Smulowitz ).
The state was active in various peacebuilding initiatives and security responses
to violence, but this study could not determine to what extent these efforts were
a response to COI recommendations. Yet the interviews revealed diverging views
within civil society on whether the absence of legal justice and accountability has
caused further violence. In the context of Plateau State, it is uncertain whether
prosecution and punishment would have led to peace. It is also unclear
whether these would have effectively addressed the underlying causes of
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conflict. As is well-documented, the drivers of recurrent violence in Plateau
State are rooted in the differentiated nature of citizenship across communities.
Measures need to be in place to avoid the selective application of citizenship
status (Sha ), and it is beyond the mandate of a single COI to resolve this.
N O T E S
. ‘Indigene’ groups include Afizere, Anaguta and Berom communities; see Madueke (a) for a
fuller discussion. Hausa and Fulani communities have separate histories and languages, but are often
linked in Nigeria. The ‘settler’ communities stress they are ‘Jasawa’ as they have developed their own dis-
tinctive identity among the wider Hausa-Fulani, through which they emphasise that they, too, belong in Jos
(Ostien : ).
. Item number  on the Second Schedule of the  Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria
(as Amended) gives the federal government legislative powers over ‘arms, ammunition and explosives’.
However, cases do not have to be referred to Abuja for trial. The states fought and won the case against
transfer of accused persons to Abuja.
. These strategies were also confirmed in Ints , , ,  ().
R E F E R E N C E S
Ackerman, J. . ‘Co-governance for accountability: beyond “exit” and “voice”’,World Development , :
–.
Ajibola Commission of Inquiry. . Nigeria Judicial Commission of Inquiry Final Report. <http://
www.icla.up.ac.za/images/un/commissionsofinquiries/files/NIgeria%%Jos%commission
%final%report%_TORs.pdf>, accessed ...
Akinwale, A.A. . ‘Integrating the traditional and the modern conflict management strategies in
Nigeria’, African Journal of Conflict Resolution , : –.
Albert, I.O. . ‘New directions in the management of community conflicts in Nigeria: insights from the
activities of AAPW’, in O. Otite & I. O. Albert, eds. Community Conflicts in Nigeria. Ibadan: Spectrum
Books.
Angerbrandt, H. . ‘Religion, ethnicity and citizenship: demands for territorial self-determination in
southern Kaduna, Nigeria’, Journal of Contemporary African Studies , : –.
Angerbrandt, H. . ‘Deadly elections: post-election violence in Nigeria’, Journal of Modern African Studies
, : –.
Bagayoko, N., E. Hutchful & R. Luckham. . ‘Hybrid security governance in Africa: rethinking
the foundations of security, justice and legitimate public authority’, Conflict, Security & Development ,
: –.
Bakiner, O. . ‘Truth commission impact: an assessment of how commissions influence politics and
society’, International Journal of Transitional Justice : –.
Balint, J., J. Evans & N. McMillan. . ‘Justice claims in colonial contexts: Commissions of inquiry in his-
torical perspective’, Australian Feminist Law Journal , : –.
Belloni, R. . ‘Civil society in war-to-democracy transitions’, in A.K. Jarstad & T.D. Sisk, eds. From War to
Democracy: Dilemmas of peacebuilding. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, –.
Crocker, D.A. . ‘Truth commissions, transitional justice and civil society’, in R.I. Rotberg &
D. Thompson, eds. Truth vs. Justice. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, –.
Daushep, K. . ‘Senator Mantu to engage Plateau PDP guber aspirants on consensus arrangements’,
Today NG, .., <https://www.today.ng/news/politics/-senator mantu-engage-plateau-pdp-
guber-aspirants-consensus-arrangement->, accessed ...
Fox, J. a. Accountability Politics: power and voice in rural Mexico. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Fox, J. b. ‘The uncertain relationship between transparency and accountability’, Development in Practice
, : –.
Fox, J. . ‘Social accountability: what does the evidence really say?’, World Development : –.
Fox, J. . Scaling Accountability through Vertically Integrated Civil Society Policy Monitoring and Advocacy.
Making All Voices Count Working Paper. <https://www.ids.ac.uk/publications/scaling-accountability-
through-vertically-integrated-civil-society-policy-monitoring-and-advocacy/>, accessed ...
C O M M I S S I O N S O F I N Q U I R Y A N D A C C O U N T A B I L I T Y , N I G E R I A
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X21000252
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 109.151.204.193, on 03 Dec 2021 at 09:56:56, subject to the Cambridge Core
Fox, J. . ‘Contested terrain: International development projects and countervailing power for the
excluded’, World Development , : –.
Goetz, A-M. & R. Jenkins. . ‘Hybrid forms of accountability: Citizen engagement in institutions of
public-sector oversight in India’, Public Management Review , : –.
Gofwen, R. . ‘A historical overview of ethno-religious conflict in Plateau State: government interven-
tions and strategies’, in O.J. Para-Mallam, ed. Finding Durable Peace in Plateau. Kuru, Nigeria: National
Insititute for Policy and Strategic Studies, –.
Greenawalt, K. . ‘Trials, commissions, and investigating committees: the elusive search for norms of
due process’, in R.I. Rotberg & D. Thompson, eds. Truth v. Justice: the Morality of Truth Commission.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, –.
Hagmann, T. & D. Péclard. . ‘Negotiating statehood: dynamics of power and domination in Africa’,
Development and Change , : –.
Hayner, P.B. . ‘Truth commissions: a schematic overview’, International Review of the Red Cross , :
–.
Hayner, P.B. . Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth Commissions. London:
Routledge.
Higazi, A. . ‘Social mobilization and collective violence: vigilantes and militias in the Lowlands of
Plateau State, Central Nigeria’, Africa , : –.
Higazi, A. . The Jos Crisis: A Recurrent Tragedy. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Discussion Paper, No.
. <https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/nigeria/.pdf>, accessed ...
Human Rights Watch (HRW). . Arbitrary Killings by Security Forces: Submission to the Investigative
Bodies on the Novermber –,  Violence in Jos, Plateau State, Nigeria, <https://www.hrw.org/
news////nigeria-arbitrary-killings-security-forces-jos>, accessed ...
Human Rights Watch (HRW). . “Leave Everything To God”: Accountability for Inter-Communal Violence in
Plateau and Kaduna States, Nigeria. <https://www.hrw.org/report////leave-everything-god/
accountability-inter-communal-violence-plateau-and-kaduna>, accessed ...
Jain, M. . ‘“Lawfare”, instruments of governmentality and accountability, or both? An overview of
national commissions of inquiry in Africa’, in T. Probert & C. Heyns, eds. National Commissions of
Inquiry in Africa: Vehicles to Pursue Accountability for Violations of the Right to Life? Pretoria: Pretoria
University of Law Press, –.
Joshi, A. . ‘Legal empowerment and social accountability: complementary strategies toward rights-
based development in health?’, World Development : –.
Kent, L. . ‘Sounds of silence: Everyday strategies of social repair in Timor-Leste’, Australian Feminist
Law Review , : –.
Kim, H. & K. Sikkink. . ‘Explaining the deterrence effect of human rights prosecutions for transitional
countries’, International Studies Quarterly : –.
Krause, J. . A Deadly Cycle: Ethno-Religious Conflict in Jos, Plateau State, Nigeria. Geneva: Geneva
Declaration Secretariat.
Krause, J. . ‘Non-violence and civilian agency in communal war: evidence from Jos, Nigeria’, African
Affairs , : –.
Leonard, D.K. . ‘Social contracts, networks and security in tropical Africa conflict states: an overview’,
IDS Bulletin , : –.
Maclean, M. . ‘How does an inquiry inquire? A brief note on the working methods of the Bristol
Infirmary Inquiry’, Journal of Law and Society , : –.
Madueke, K.L. a. ‘Routing ethnic violence in a divided city: walking in the footsteps of armed mobs in
Jos, Nigeria’, Journal of Modern African Studies , : –.
Madueke, K.L. b. ‘From neighbours to deadly enemies: excavating landscapes of territoriality and
ethnic violence in Jos, Nigeria’, Journal of Contemporary African Studies , : –.
Méndez, J.E. . ‘Accountability for past abuses’, Human Rights Quarterly , : –.
Menkhaus, K. . ‘The rise of a mediated state in Northern Kenya: the Wajir story and its implications
for state-building’, Afrika Focus , : –.
Obateru, T. . ‘Plateau Government condemns Abubakar’s appointment as IGP’, Vanguard, ..,
<https://www.vanguardngr.com///plateau-govt-condemns-abubakars-appointment-as-igp/>,
accessed ...
Obateru, T. & L. Binniyat. . ‘ Jos crisis: Reactions trail AG IG’s appointment’, Vanguard,
.., <https://www.vanguardngr.com///-jos-crisis-reactions-trail-ag-igs-appoint-
ment/>, accessed ...
 M A R J O K E O O S T E R O M E T A L .
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X21000252
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 109.151.204.193, on 03 Dec 2021 at 09:56:56, subject to the Cambridge Core
O’Donnell, G. . ‘Horizontal accountability in new democracies’, in A. Schedler, L. Diamond & M.F.
Plattner, eds. The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies. Boulder, CO: Lynne
Rienner, –.
O’Donnell, G. . ‘Horizontal accountability: the legal institutionalization of mistrust’, In S. Mainwaring
& C. Welna, eds. Democratic Accountability in Latin America. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Orjuela, C. . ‘Civil society in civil war: the case of Sri Lanka’, Civil Wars , : –.
Ostien, P. . ‘Jonah Jang and the Jasawa: ethno-religious conflict in Jos, Nigeria’, Muslim-Christian
Relations in Africa, August  (online publication): –. <https://ssrn.com/abstract=>,
accessed ...
Oyieke, A.Y. . ‘The (im)partiality of justice: the challenges of investigating the clashes between the
Islamic Movement of Nigeria and the Nigerian army in Zaria, Nigera,’ in T. Probert & C. Heyns, eds.
National Commissions of Inquiry in Africa: vehicles to pursue accountability for violations of the right to life?
Pretoria: Pretoria University of Law Press, –.
Peruzzotti, E. . ‘Broadening the notion of democratic accountability: participatory innovation in Latin
America’, Polity , : –.
Peruzzotti, E. . ‘Accountability deficits of delegative democracy’, in D. Brinks, M. Leiras &
S. Mainwaring, eds. Reflections on Uneven Democracies: the legacy of Guillermo O’Donnell. Baltimore,
MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, –.
Peruzzotti, E. & C. Smulovitz. . ‘Societal accountability in Latin America’, Journal of Democracy ,
: –.
Peruzzotti, E. & C. Smulovitz (eds) . Enforcing the Rule of Law: social accountability in the new Latin
American democracies. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.
Probert, T. . Vehicles for Accountability or Cloaks of Impunity? How can National Commissions of Inquiry
Achieve Accountability for Violations of the Right to Life? The Institute for Justice and Reconciliation,
Policy Brief No. . <http://www.ijr.org.za/portfolio-items/policy-brief-no--vehicles-for-accountabil-
ity-or-cloaks-of-impunity/>, accessed ...
Probert, T. . ‘The concept of accountability and its importance for the protection of the right to life’,
in T. Probert & C. Heyns, eds. National Commissions of Inquiry in Africa: Vehicles to pursue accountability for
violations of the right to life? Pretoria: Pretoria University of Law Press, –.
Probert, T. & C. Heyns (eds) . ‘Introduction: the role of national commissions of inquiry in securing
the supreme human right’, in National Commissions of Inquiry in Africa: vehicles to pursue accountability for
violations of the right to life? Pretoria: Pretoria University of Law Press, –.
Raleigh, C., L. Linke, H. Hegre & J. Karlsen. . ‘Introducing ACLED: An Armed Conflict Location and
Event Dataset’, Journal of Peace Research , : –.
Right to Know. . ‘Access to the Reports of Judicial Commissions of Inquiry on Jos Crisis.’ <https://
rknigeria.org/index.php/publication/rk-publications/inquiry-on-jos-crisis/review-of-the-judicial-
commissions-of-inquiry-on-the-conflicts-in-jos-plateau-state>, accessed ...
Ross, F.C. . ‘An acknowledged failure: women, voice, violence and the South African Truth and
Reconciliation Commission’, in R. Shaw, L. Waldorf & P. Hazen, eds. Localizing Transitional Justice: inter-
ventions and priorities after mass violence. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, –.
Rotberg, R.I. . ‘Truth commissions and the provision of truth, justice, and reconciliation’, in R.I.
Rotberg & D. Thompson, eds. Truth vs. Justice: the Morality of Truth Commission. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, –.
Rotberg, R.I. & D. Thompson (eds) . Truth v. Justice: the Morality of Truth Commission. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Sayne, A. . Rethinking Nigeria’s Indigine-Settler Conflicts. USIP Special Report No. , <https://www.
usip.org/publications///rethinking-nigerias-indigene-settler-conflicts>, accessed ...
Sha, D.P. . The Politicization of Settler-Native Identities and Ethno-Religious Conflicts in Jos, Central Nigeria.
Ibadan: Stirling-Horden Publishers.
Suberu, R.T. . ‘The challenge of ethnic conflict: the travails of federalism in Nigeria’, Journal of
Democracy , : –.
Suberu, R.T. . ‘Religion and institutions: federalism and the management of conflicts over Sharia in
Nigeria’, Journal of International Development , : –.
Titeca, K. & T. De Herdt. . ‘Real governance beyond the “failed state”: negotiating education in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo’, African Affairs , : –.
Yusuf, H.O. . ‘Colonialism and the dilemmas of transitional justice in Nigeria’, International Journal of
Transitional Justice : –.
Zvobgo, K. . ‘Demanding truth: the global transitional justice network and the creation of Truth
Commissions’, International Studies Quarterly , : –.
C O M M I S S I O N S O F I N Q U I R Y A N D A C C O U N T A B I L I T Y , N I G E R I A
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X21000252
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 109.151.204.193, on 03 Dec 2021 at 09:56:56, subject to the Cambridge Core
A P P E N D I X  . L I S T O F I N T E R V I E W S
No. Role Date of Interview
 Youth Movement representative ..
 Former Secretary to the Government ..
 Politician and ethnic association representative ..
 Human rights organisation representative ..
 Youth Movement representative ..
 Attorney, Plateau State government ..
 Council of Elders representative ..
 Politician and ethnic association representative ..
 Private legal practitioner ..
 Muslim women organisation representative ..
 Chairperson of a Christian association ..
 Interfaith organisation representative ..
 Youth Movement representative ..
 Christian Women organisation representative ..
 Youth Movement representative ..
 Yoruba community representative ..
 Youth Movement representative ..
 Ethnic development association representative ..
 Human rights organisation representative ..
 Representative from a Human rights organisation ..
 Youth Movement representative ..
 Representative from a Human rights organisation ..
 Journalist ..
 Retired senior official, Ministry of Justice ..
 Journalist and former chair of a journalist association ..
 Senior official, Plateau State Government ..
 Senior official, Plateau State Government ..
 Politician and representative of an ethnic association ..
 Former state governor ..
 Interfaith organisation representative ..
 Private legal practitioner ..
 Muslim women organisation representative ..
 Muslim religious organisation representative ..
 Women’s organisation representative ..
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